

MARKET MONITOR REPORT FOR AUCTION 59

Prepared for:

RGGI, Inc., on behalf of the RGGI Participating States

Prepared By:



March 10, 2023



This report was prepared by Potomac Economics (the contractor) in the course of performing work contracted for and sponsored by RGGI, Inc. on behalf of states participating in RGGI (Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania,¹ Rhode Island, Vermont, and Virginia). The opinions expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect those of RGGI, Inc. or any of the states participating in RGGI, and reference to any specific product, service, process, or method does not constitute an implied or expressed recommendation or endorsement of it. Further, RGGI, Inc., the states participating in RGGI, and the contractor make no warranties or representations, expressed or implied, as to the fitness for particular purpose or merchantability of any product, apparatus, or service, or the usefulness, completeness, or accuracy of any processes, methods, or other information contained, described, disclosed, or referred to in this report. RGGI, Inc., the states participating in RGGI, and the contractor make no representation that the use of any product, apparatus, process, method, or other information will not infringe privately owned rights and will assume no liability for any loss, injury, or damage resulting from, or occurring in connection with, the use of information contained, described, disclosed, disclosed, or referred to in this report.

The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is the first mandatory market-based regulatory initiative in the U.S. to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. RGGI is a cooperative effort of New England and Mid-Atlantic states to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide (CO_2) from the power sector.

RGGI, Inc. is a non-profit corporation created to provide technical and administrative services to the states participating in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative.

¹ While technically a RGGI participating state, Pennsylvania is currently under order from the state's Commonwealth Court prohibiting it from actively participating in RGGI & RGGI Inc. related activities. Final adjudication of these matters is not expected until sometime in 2023.



MARKET MONITOR REPORT FOR AUCTION 59

As the Market Monitor for the RGGI CO₂ allowance market, Potomac Economics monitors the conduct of market participants in the auctions and in the secondary market to identify indications of market manipulation or collusion. We also review the administration of the allowance auctions by Enel X. This report summarizes our findings regarding RGGI Auction 59, which was held on March 8, 2023.

We observed the auction as it occurred and have completed our review and analysis of its results. Based on our review of bids in the auction, we find no material evidence of collusion or manipulation by bidders.

Fifty-six bidders participated in the auction for CO₂ allowances. Bids were submitted to purchase 2.4 times the initial offering of approximately 21.5 million allowances, resulting in a clearing price of \$12.50 per ton in the auction. The Cost Containment Reserve ("CRR") Trigger Price is \$14.88 per ton for auctions held in 2023, so no CCR allowances were sold in the auction. Compliance-Oriented Entities purchased 63 percent of the allowances in the offering. There was no indication of barriers to participation in the auction.

Based on our review of the administration of the market, we found that:

- The auction was administered in a fair and transparent manner in accordance with the noticed auction procedures and limitations.
- The auction results were consistent with the market rules and the bids received.
- Sensitive information was treated appropriately by the auction administrator.
- There were no indications of issues with the auction platform such as hardware or software problems, communications issues, or security breaches.

In summary, the results of our monitoring of RGGI Auction 59 raise no material concerns regarding the auction process, barriers to participation in the auction, or the competitiveness of the auction results. The appendix provides additional information about the market for RGGI CO_2 allowances and outcomes of the auction.



APPENDIX

A. DISPERSION OF PROJECTED DEMAND

The wide dispersion of projected demand for RGGI allowances across compliance entities facilitates the competitive performance of the auction.

The demand for CO_2 allowances is based on the requirement for each compliance entity in the RGGI footprint to obtain one CO_2 allowance for each short ton of CO_2 that it emits from the sale of electricity. The following figure shows the relative shares of projected demand for RGGI allowances by compliance entity in the fifth control period. The largest compliance entity represents 17 percent of the total projected demand for allowances. Nearly half of the projected demand is composed of entities that each account for less than 5 percent of the total demand. Participation by a large number of entities facilitates the competitive performance of the auction.




Figure 1: Projected Demand for RGGI Allowances Shares by Compliance Entity



B. SUMMARY OF PURCHASES OF ALLOWANCES IN AUCTION 59

Awards were distributed across 49 bidders with four bidders purchasing one million tons or more and 25 bidders purchasing 200,000 tons or more.

This report summarizes participation in Auction 59. Participation in the RGGI market involves many different firms with various interests in RGGI allowances. Some participate in order to satisfy compliance obligations, others have investment interests, and still others participate for both purposes. To more effectively track the activity of different participants, we use several classifications for participant firms. Figure 2 summarizes the relationship between these classifications.




Figure 2: Classifications of Participant Firms in the RGGI Marketplace

- *Compliance-Oriented Entities* are compliance entities that appear to acquire and hold allowances primarily to satisfy their compliance obligations.
- *Investors with Compliance Obligations* are firms that have compliance obligations but which hold a number of allowances that exceeds their estimated compliance obligations by a margin suggesting they also buy for re-sale or some other investment purpose. These firms often transfer significant quantities of allowances to unaffiliated firms.²

² The assessment of whether a compliance entity holds a number of allowances that exceeds its compliance obligations by a margin that suggests they are also buying for re-sale or some other investment purpose is based on: (a) the entity's forecasted share of the total compliance obligations in the RGGI footprint through 2026, (b) the total number of allowances in circulation, and (c) consideration of the pattern of the entity's allowance transfers to unaffiliated firms versus affiliated firms. Since the designation of a compliance entity as an investor is based on a review of its transactions and holdings, the designation of a particular firm may change over time as more information becomes available.



• Investors without Compliance Obligations are firms without any compliance obligations.

These three categories form the basis for two overlapping groups.

- *Compliance Entities* All firms with compliance obligations and their affiliates.³ Combines the first and second of the above categories.
- *Investors* All firms which are assessed to be purchasing for investment rather than compliance purposes. Combines the second and third of the above categories.

In Auction 59, Compliance Entities purchased 82 percent of the allowances sold. In the first 59 RGGI auctions, Compliance Entities purchased 73 percent of the allowances sold. In Auction 59, Compliance-Oriented Entities purchased 63 percent of the allowances sold.

After settlement of allowances sold in Auction 59:

- Fifty-five percent of the allowances in circulation will be held by Compliance-Oriented Entities.
- Sixty percent of the allowances in circulation are believed to be held for compliance purposes. The number of allowances that are believed to be held for compliance purposes includes 100 percent of the allowances held by Compliance-Oriented Entities and a portion of allowances held by Investors with Compliance Obligations.

The following table shows the quantity of allowances purchased by each bidder. The identity of each bidder is masked, and the bidders are ranked according to the amount of allowances awarded, from largest to smallest.

³ Affiliates are firms that: (i) have a parent-subsidiary relationship with a compliance entity, (ii) are subsidiaries of a parent company that has a large interest in a compliance entity, (iii) have substantial control over the operation of a budget source and/or responsibility for acquiring RGGI allowances to satisfy its compliance obligations.

Bidder	Number of Allowances Awarded	Bidder	Number of Allowances Awarded
Bidder 1	4,120,000	Bidder 26	163,877
Bidder 2	3,900,000	Bidder 27	150,000
Bidder 3	1,200,000	Bidder 28	125,000
Bidder 4	1,190,000	Bidder 29	100,000
Bidder 5	988,000	Bidder 30	100,000
Bidder 6	801,000	Bidder 31	100,000
Bidder 7	800,000	Bidder 32	59,000
Bidder 8	800,000	Bidder 33	50,000
Bidder 9	764,000	Bidder 34	49,000
Bidder 10	750,000	Bidder 35	45,000
Bidder 11	708,000	Bidder 36	40,000
Bidder 12	637,000	Bidder 37	25,000
Bidder 13	450,000	Bidder 38	23,000
Bidder 14	400,000	Bidder 39	20,000
Bidder 15	399,000	Bidder 40	18,000
Bidder 16	346,000	Bidder 41	11,000
Bidder 17	300,000	Bidder 42	10,000
Bidder 18	275,000	Bidder 43	10,000
Bidder 19	255,000	Bidder 44	6,000
Bidder 20	250,000	Bidder 45	4,000
Bidder 21	250,000	Bidder 46	4,000
Bidder 22	220,000	Bidder 47	3,000
Bidder 23	200,000	Bidder 48	3,000
Bidder 24	200,000	Bidder 49	1,000
Bidder 25	200,000		

Table 1: Quantity of Allowances Awarded by Bidder



C. DISPERSION OF BIDS IN AUCTION 59

Bids were submitted by 35 Compliance-Oriented Entities and 21 Investors. In our review of the bids and the qualification process, we found no material evidence of anti-competitive conduct or inappropriate barriers to participation.

The following figure summarizes the quantity of allowances for which bids were submitted by each bidder. Ten Compliance-Oriented Entities and nine Investors submitted bids for a large quantity of allowances (i.e., at least 1 million tons). Overall, Compliance-Oriented Entities accounted for 51 percent of the quantity of allowances for which bids were submitted. The quantity of allowances for which bids were submitted was 2.4 times the Initial Offering. In the previous auction, the quantity of allowances for which bids were submitted was also 2.4 times the Initial Offering.

The bid quantities were widely distributed among the 56 bidders. The concentration of bids, using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI"), was relatively low at 498. The HHI is a standard measure of concentration calculated by squaring each entity's percent share and then summing the squares across all entities (i.e., the index ranges from 0 to 10,000).




Figure 3: Quantity of Bids Submitted by Entity By Type of Entity and Quantity Bid

D. SUMMARY OF BID PRICES IN AUCTION 59

Bids were submitted across a wide range of prices in the auction and the clearing price of \$12.50 was relatively consistent with average bid prices submitted.

The following table reports several statistics regarding the bid prices for bids submitted in Auction 59. The median and mean bid prices are weighted by the quantity of each bid.

Bid Prices:	
Minimum	\$2.50
Maximum	\$17.57
Average (Median)	\$12.33
Average (Mean)	\$11.28
Clearing Price:	\$12.50



E. NAMES OF POTENTIAL BIDDERS IN AUCTION 59

In accordance with Sections 2.8 and 3 of the Auction Notice for CO₂ Allowance Auction 59, the Participating States are releasing the names of Potential Bidders in Auction 59. The states defined potential bidders as: "Each Applicant that has been qualified and submitted a complete *Intent to Bid.*" The list of 75 Potential Bidders is as follows:

Anew Environmental, LLC Appalachian Power Company Astoria Energy, LLC BP Products North America Inc. Braintree Electric Light Department **Buchanan** Generation Caithness Long Island, LLC Calpine Energy Services, LP Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Carbon Lighthouse Association Citadel Energy Marketing LLC Clear Sky Enhanced Inflation Carbon Master Fund LP Coloma Strategies LLC Commonwealth Chesapeake Company, LLC Consolidated Edison Comp. of NY, Inc. Constellation Energy Generation, LLC Cooler, Inc. CPV Maryland, LLC CPV Shore, LLC CPV Towantic, LLC CPV Valley, LLC Cricket Valley Energy Center, LLC Delaware City Refining Company, LLC Delaware Municipal Electric Corp. DTE Energy Trading, Inc. Dynegy Marketing and Trade, LLC East Coast Environmental, LLC Edgewood Energy, LLC Elbow River Marketing LTD. Empire Generating Co., LLC Equus Power I, LP Footprint Power Salem Harbor Development LP Gen IV Investment Opportunities, LLC Hartree Partners, LP Hawkeye Energy Greenport Helix Ravenswood Energy, LLC Indeck-Corinth Limited Partnership J. Aron & Company

Jamestown Board of Public Utilities Kcarbon Holdings LLC Kendall Green Energy LLC Kleen Energy Systems, LLC KMC Thermo, LLC Koch Supply & Trading, LP Lucid Clarity Master Fund LP Macquarie Energy, LLC Mercuria Energy America, LLC Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc. MV Global Carbon Fund LP National Grid Generation LLC dba National Grid New Athens Generating Company, LLC Newark Energy Center NextEra Energy Marketing, LLC NRG Power Marketing LLC Ocean State Power, LLC Old Dominion Electric Cooperative Pegasus Development Corporation Pinelawn Power, LLC Pixelle Androscoggin LLC Potomac Energy Center, LLC Power Authority of the State of New York RBC Rhode Island State Energy Center, LP Selkirk Cogen Partners, LP Shell Energy North America (US), LP Shoreham Energy, LLC Statkraft US, LLC STX Commodities LLC Tenaska Pennsylvania Partners, LLC Tenaska, Inc. Trafigura Trading LLC Village of Freeport Virginia Electric and Power Company Vitol Inc. Wallingford Energy, LLC